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. IN THE SUPREME ... COURT·~-~ 
OF ·c·THE. STATE OF UTAH 
. . 
In the· Matter. of the· ESTAT·E ·oF . 
· MAUDE K. BARLOW, also known . .. · ··· 
as MAUD·E KARREN RICHAR.DS Case No. 8682 
and MAUDE K .. RICHARDS~ 
Deceased. 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF~ 
MAUDE KARREN RICHARD·S, . Case No. 8683 
Deceased. 
SHELDON R. BREWSTER, AUDREY 
,: B. ·BELL, HOYT W. BREWSTER, 
:- · KYLE H. BREWSTER, and LAEL 
B. GEE, 
Plaint~ffs and Respondents, Case No.· 8825 
-vs.-
WILLIAM BARLOW, et al., 
Defendants an-d Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS, IN CASE NO. 8682 AND 8683 AND 
PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS IN 
CASE NO. 8825 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel for Hoyt ~ W. Br~wster, et al., have made. 
a statement of facts in their initial brief, therefore nq 
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further statement as such is appropriate here. However, 
it should be restated that it is not determined whether 
Ben S. Brewster and Maude Karren Richards were 
marred subsequent to their having executed the re-
ciprocal wills and agreement on February 7, 1939. The 
pre-trial order, Case No. 8825, specifically found that 
there existed this issue of fact (R. 62). 
Errors and unjustified inferences with respect to 
the facts as stated by respondent "~ be discussed in 
the argument which follows. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
A SUBSEQUENT l\iARRIAGE BETWEEN BE N S. 
BREWSTER AND MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS WOULD 
NOT REVOKE THE WILL OF BEN S. BREWSTER, WHERE 
THE LATTER HAD MADE PROVISION FOR MAUDE KAR-
REN RICHARDS IN HIS WILL. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NO BAR TO THE CIVIL 
ACTION COMMENCED BY HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL. 
POINT III. 
THE WILL AND AGREEMENT OF l\fAUDE KARREN 
RICHARDS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS SUPPORTED 
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. 
POINT IV. 
THE RECIPROCAL WILL OF MAUDE KARREN RICH-
ARDS WHICH IS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, SHOULD 
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,HAVE !.BEEN: ADlWITTED '
1
.TO P.ROBATE·_,RA-THER TH~A;N 
THE L~~ER OLOGRAPHIC WILl-s,. AND;:,LE.TT$R~~ T~~'fA­
MENTARY ·sHOULD Ii'AVE ISSUED ··To· HOYT .. W. BREW:-STER. >. ·:· '... . . . . . . . .. , . . f.· .· .• · . 
J· •• 
.'1' 
POINT V. 
I~ 
.· T·HE .ACTION OF HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL., FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE RECIPROCAL WILL 
AND CONTRACT OF FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS NOT PREMA-
TURE.:.· 
POINT VI. 
IN POINT IV OF HIS REPLY BRIEF, BARLOW HAS 
MISCONSTRUED THE RECIPROCAL. WILL .AND AGREE-
MENT OF MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS DATED FEBRU-
ARY 7, 1939, AND HAS MISCONSTRUED THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE COURT WHICH CORRECTLY GRANTS 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE SAID WILL AND 
AGREEMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE BETWEEN B E N S . 
. BREWS:TER AND MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS WOULD 
NOT .REVOKE THE WILL OF BEN S. BREWSTER, vVHERE 
THE LATTER HAD MADE PROVISION FOR MAUDE KAR-
REN RICHARDS IN HIS WILL . 
. s·ection 74-1-25 U.C.A., 1953, does not reqtiire that 
a bequest to a woman who later becomes the wife of· a 
testator appear on its face to be in contemplation of 
marriage to prevent a revocation of a 'viii. 
This: iss~e conc~rns the validity of the will of Ben 
S .. Brewster dated February 7, 1939. William Barlo"v 
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~ays that Ben S. Bre,vster's will 'vas revoked by a sub-
sequent marriage of Ben S. Bre,vster and ~laude Karren 
Richards (8825, R. 61) and that thereby ~faude Karren 
Richards was free to execute another will 'vhich she in 
fact did. See Point II of Barlo,v's brief. 
The question of the Inarriage of Ben S. Brewster 
and 1Iaude Karren Richards is not resolved. Counsel 
for Barlow on page 13 of his brief says that the trial 
court by its judgment (8825, R. 89) found that such 
marriage existed. Such is not the case. The court \vas 
merely h"olding that a marriage, if it occurred, \\t·ould 
not revoke the 'vills. At the pre-trial of the case the 
court specifically found that the question of marriage 
'vas a factual iten1 to he detern1ined (8825, R. 62). 
Hoyt Bre,vster, et al., contended that even if Ben 
S. Brewster and ~faude Karren Richards "~ere 1narried 
subsequent to the execution of the reciprocal 'vills, the 
reciprocal 'vill of Ben S. Bre,vster "vas not revoked by 
virtue of said Sec. 7 4-1-25 U.C.A., 1953, because :Jiaude 
Karren Richards 'vas provided for therein. See Point 
No. 1 of the initial brief of Hoyt \V. Bre,,,.ster, et al. 
However, should the court rule that such a n1arriage, 
if it occurred, would have revoked the "ill, the judgn1ent 
of the trial court should still be affir1ned for the reasons 
set forth in Points II through , ... of the initial brief. 
The case of In Re Poisrs Estate. :2SO P. (:2d) 789, 
(Cal. 1955), relied upon by Barlo"·, has been analyzed 
jn detail. See page 13, et seq., of the initial brief .. A.s 
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pointed out, the case is not controlling here and should 
not be followed. 
As further authority for the proposition that Ben 
S. Brewster's will was revoked, counsel cites In Re 
Scolpino's Will, 248 N.Y.S. 634, and In Re Anderson's 
·Estate, 131 P. 975 (Ariz. 1913). See Barlo'v brief, p. 17. 
In Re Anderson's Estate, supra, involved a statute 
silnilar to Section 74-1-25 U:C.A., 1953, but there the 
silnilarity ends, for the court specifically noted that 
the one who became the testator's wife was not "provided 
for in the will, nor mentioned therein." In the instant 
case, as pointed out above, Maude Karren Richards 'vas 
provided for in the will of Ben S. Bre,vster (Ex. 2). 
The case is obviously not in point and rather than 
helping Barlo,v, infers that had Anderson's widow been 
"provided for in the will" it 'vould not have been revoked. 
In Re Scolpino's Will, supra, decided many years 
ago by one of the lower courts of the State of N e'v York, 
~s contrary to the position contended for by Hoyt W. 
Brewster, et al. However, the courts in New York at that 
time were not at all consistent. For example, see the 
case of In Re Neufeld's Will, 260 N.Y.S. 302. In that case 
the will was held not to be revoked even though there 
was no indication in the 'viii itself that a bequest to 
a certain lady was in contemplation of 1narriage. The 
testator later married the woman provided for and the 
will was held not to be revoked. Also in the case of 
In Re Gaffken's Will, 188 N.Y.S. 852, affirn1ed 135 
N.E. 971, the will was not revoked by the subsequent 
marriage, even though the "rill expressed no contempla-
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tion of marriage bet,veen the testator and the one pro-
vided for. It is true that in these two latter cases the 
court considered some evidence outside of the "\vill as 
suggesting that there might possibly have been a con-
templation of marriage. However, because it was recog-
nized that the status of the law in Ne'v York \vas so 
confused by the courts, the Comn1ission in 1931 recom-
mended an amendment to the statute. An amend1nent 
to the New York statute did result and the amended 
~tatute now reads: 
~'If after making any will, said testator mar-
ries, and the husband or wife survives the tes-
tator, such will shall be deemed revoked as to 
such survivor, unless provision shall have been 
made for such survivor by an anti-nuptial agree-
tnent in writing . . ." Book 13, Decedent Estate 
Law, ~1cKinney's Consolidated La,vs of New 
York, Ann., Art. 2, par. 35. 
The general state1nents fron1 97 C.J.S., Sec. 1366 
(d), p. 299, and 95 C.J.S. Sec., 291 (:2), p. 76, are too 
general and are not applicable to the instant case. As 
a matter of fact the latter state1nent cites as supporting 
authority the case of In Re Ande-rson's Estate, supra, 
distinguished above . 
.!\..side fron1 the question of the effect on Ben S. 
Brewster's reciprocal \Yill of a possible subsequent Inar-
riage to ~{aude 1\::arren Richards, there is no doubt 
that \vhen an agreen1ent for the exeeution of reciprocal 
'vills exists the san1e "rill be enforced in a court of 
equity. See 169 A.L.R. 1, 55 and 97 (:.J.S., \\Tills~ See. 
1366. rPhis principal of la\v \Vas not even 1uade an issue 
'6 
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at the pre-trial (8825, R. 60-61). It is conceded to be the 
law by counsel for Barlo'v ( 8623, R. 21). 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NO BAR TO THE CIVIL 
ACTION CO·MMENCED BY HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL. 
In Point III of his brief, counsel for Barlo'v makes 
a unique and feeble argument regarding the applicability 
of the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 25-5-1, et seq., U.C.A., 
1953. Some point is made of the fact that the reciprocal 
wills and agreement did not contain an actual state-
ment whereby the parties agreed not to revoke the wills. 
If not expressed, it is obviously implied that the agree-
ment and the reciprocal wills would not be revoked. This 
is elementary. 
Such an argument is totally without merit. In para-
graph VIII of Maude Karren Richards' ·vvill (Ex. 1) 
and in paragraph XI of. Ben S. Bre,vster's will (Ex. 
2), it is stated that the wills are made purs'uant to 
written agreement and in accordance therewith. Each 
reciprocal will is stated to be in consideration for the 
other. The written agreen1ent is part of Ex. 1. 
While this issue was raised in Barlow's amended 
answer, the pre-trial order is silent about such a con-
tention on· the part of Barlow (8825, R. 60-61) and 
counsel's brief below never mentioned it (8825, R. 63-71). 
The novel argument of counsel is grasping at stra-\vs to 
say the least. 
Ward v. Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P. (2d) 635, in no 
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wise resen1bles the instant case, nor do the other cases 
cited by counsel on this point. The Statute of Frauds, 
Sec. 25-5-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, has been co1npletely 
satisfied. 
POINT III. 
THE WILL AND AGREEMENT OF MAUDE KARREN 
RICHARDS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS SUPPORTED 
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. 
As for the consideration and equities of the case, 
Barlo,v,_ on pages 24-28 of his brief, has made son1e point 
of the fact that Maude l{arren Richards only received 
one-third of the Ben S. Brewster Estate and that Hoyt 
W. ·Brewster, et al., are no'v seeking to obtain all of 
the Maude Karren Richards Estate. Such a comparison, 
of course, is utterly meaningless. If it is significant 
at all, it should be pointed out that ~laude l{arren 
Richards' distributive share under the Ben S. Bre,vster 
will amounted to some $7,500. Such an amount appears 
to be somewhere near the total value of the Maude 
Karren Richards Estate. If this comparison is of any 
consequence, then there is certainly no equity favoring 
Barlow. 
Counsel contends that Maude Karren Richards only 
took under the Ben S. Bre~"ster "rill such part of his 
estate as she would have been entitled to as his '\ri.dow. 
This argument overlooks the fact that had !1aude l{ar-
ren Richards been in fact the '\\rife of Ben S. Bre,vster, 
the latter would have had no obligation aside fron1 the 
obligation under the contract, to leave her one-third 
of his ent~re estate. 
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Were there no such contract, and 'vere she insuffi-
ciently provided for, she could elect to take one-third 
of the real estate in lieu of her distributive share under 
the will. See Sec. 74-4-4 U.C.A., 1953. But the one-third 
of the real estate might have been much less than one-
third of the entire estate which ~faude l{arren Richards 
did, in fact, receive .. In addition thereto she, of course, 
received one-half of the executor's fee. 
Suffice it to say that there existed between l\:Iaude 
Karren Richards and Ben S. Brewster an actual 'vritten 
agreement containing mutual covenants and promises 
between the parties, Ex. 1, and the executed vvills, Exs. 
1 and 2, each executed in consideration for the other. 
Mutual promises of the parties is sufficient considera-
tion. Lawrence v. Ashba, 59 N.E. (2d) 568, (Ind. 1945), 
97 ·C.J.S. Wills, Sec. 1367 (b) p. 302. 
1faude Karren Richards received her distributive 
share under the will of Ben S. Brewster vvithout raising 
any question as to the validity of his vvill. It is only 
equitable and in accordance with good conscience that 
the provisions of Maude Karren Richard's will and the 
agreement of February 7, 1939, no'v be enforced. 
Even were it to be held that Ben S. Brewster's 
will would be revoked by a subsequent marriage to 
Maude Karren Richards, and even were it to be further 
assumed that such a marriage occurred, still it could not 
be successfully argued that the revocation of Ben S. 
Brewster's will imposed by law would affect the agree-
ment between the parties. His will would only be revoked 
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as a will. The agreement would still stand .. ~laude Kar-
I·en Richards having taken under the agreement, it can-
not now be sensibly argued that there is a lack of con-
sideration to support the enforcement of her reciprocal 
will. 
The net effect of allowing Barlow to prevail i~ this 
case would be to allow him a windfall and permit him 
to enjoy the benefits of both the Ben S. Brewster Estate 
and Maude Karren Richards Estate to the exclusion 
of rightful beneficiaries. 
POINT IV. 
THE RECIPROCAL WILL OF MAUDE KARREN RICH-
ARDS WHICH IS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO PROBATE RATHER THAN 
THE LATER OLOGRAPHIC WILL, AND LETTERS TESTA-
MENTARY SHOULD HAVE ISSUED TO HOYT W. BREW-
STER. 
Counsel for Barlow in Point No. 1 of his brief has 
cited several authorities holding that "~here a party, after 
having received benefits under a reciprocal "ill in his 
favor, violates an agree1nent for reciprocal \Yills by exe-
cuting a later revoking "\vill, the later \vill should be 
admitted to Probate while the contract between the 
parties should be enforced in equity. In Point \"'I of 
the initial brief of Hoyt \\T. Bre"Tster, et al., \\Te adnritted 
that the authorities have frequently so held. 
However, though son1e courts have so held, there is 
goo? authority for holding that the earlier reciprocal 
\Vill is silnply irrevocable and that a later revoking 'vill 
10 
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should be denied admission to probate. In the case of 
In Re Edwards' Estate, 120 N.E. (2d) 10 (1954), the 
Supreme Court of Illinois affir1ned the trial court which 
adn1itted to probate an earlier joint will and denied 
probate of a later docu1nent purporting to be the last 
'vill and testament of the same decedent. See also Jacoby 
v. Jacoby, 96 N.E. (2d) 362 (Ill., 1950), and 97 C.J.S., 
Wills, Sec. 1366 (b), p. 296 and cases therein cited. 
We reaffirn1 our argument set forth in Point \TI 
of the initial brief and particularly invite the court's 
attention to the exceptions to the general rule therein 
noted. Where the total estate is affected by the prior 
reciprocal will there is no substantial reason for ad-
mitting the later revoking 'viii to I>robate. All that 'vould 
be probated is a "hollow shell." 
There is no reason why, under such circu1nstances 
as this, it should not simply be declared, as 'vas done in 
the cases cited above, that the earlier 'vill is an irre-
vocable will; that the later will is invalid and adn1it the 
earlier will to probate and thereby save considerable 
time and expense and certainly the empty for1nality of 
probating a will under which none of the estate \vill 
pass. 
We respectfully submit that notwithstanding the 
rule that p r e v a i I s in some of the jurisdictions, 
this Court should seriously consider establishing the 
law in this State as herein contended for. Such a posi-
tion is not without precedent and is certainly proper 
'vhere Probate Courts such as ours, are clothed ""'ith 
11 
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an1ple authority. See Point \TI of the initial brief of 
Hoyt \V. Brewster, et al. 
POINT ·v. 
THE ACTION OF HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL., FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE RECIPROCAL WILL 
AND CONTRACT OF FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS NOT PREMA-
TURE. 
Counsel for William ~Iuir Barlo'v makes the general 
statement on page 12 of his brief, under Point I, that 
Hoyt W. Brewster, et al., had no cause of action for 
specific performance of the reciprocal will until the 
Probate Court had denied its admission to Probate. Ko 
such contention has heretofore been made by counsel 
for Barlow and no specific authority is cited for the 
broad general statement. 
Where Maude Karren Richards toqk her distribu-
tive share under the will of Ben S. Bre,Yster, by the 
very nature of her agreement 'Yith hil11, a cause of action 
would arise in favor of the beneficiaries under the re-
ciprocal will ilnn1ediately upon her death. Even before 
death the rights of beneficiaries can be protected. 
"There is substantial authority in support 
of the po"'er of a court of equity to grant in-
junctive relief to restrain the surviv-ing party of 
a contract to n1ake "'"ills 'vith 1nutual and re-
ciprocal provisions fron1 conveying or transfer-
ring the pToperty in violation of the contract, 
upon de1nand for such relief hy one 'Yho \Vould 
be prejudicied by a breach of a contract.'' 169 
A.I~.R,. 1, 59. 
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In anticipation of this very argument, ho\vever, Hoyt 
"\V. Bre\vster, et al., as soon as Willian1 Barlo\v had 
been named executor of the later olographic \vill of 
~laude l(arren Richards, filed an amended con1plaint 
in Case No. 8825 (Civil action No. 107,499 belo\v), nau1ing 
as defendants, runong others, "\V-illiarn Barlo\v, person-
ally, and William Barlo\v, Executor of the Last \Vjll 
and Testament of ~Iaude l(arren Barlo\v, etc. (8825, R. 
38-41) The argument of counsel for vVilliau1 Barlo\v that 
the ·Civil Action is preu1ature, con1pletely overlooked this 
fact. All interested parties were before the Court in 
the civil matter. The Court having jurisdiction of the 
property \vas in a position to specifically enforce the 
reciprocal \vill and agreement of ~laude Karren Ric-h-
ards, dated February 7, 1939. 
POINT VI. 
IN POINT IV OF HIS REPLY BRIEF, BARLOW HAS 
::\1ISCONSTRUED THE RECIPROCAL WILL AND AGREE-
MENT OF MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS DATED FEBRU-
ARY 7, 1939, AND HAS MISCONSTRUED THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE CO·URT WHICH CORRECTLY GRANTS 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE SAID WILL AND 
AGREEMENT. 
In Point IV of his reply brief, Barlo\v has challenged 
the propriety of the judg1nent entered by the Court in 
the Civil Action, Case No. 8825. 
So that there can be no nlisunderstanding as to 
the applicable provisions of the reciprocal "~in of ~Iaude 
Karren Richards and the judgment entered by the Court, 
13 
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the pertinent portions thereof are set forth below for 
the convenience of the Court. 
In paragraph II of her reciprocal will (Ex. 1), 
Maude Karren Richards stated the follo\ving: 
"I declare that I am the owner of the real 
and personal property including the following de-
scribed property : 
"One insurance policy in the sum of 
$1,000.00 in the West ·Coast Life Insurance 
Company, payable to my estate. 
"One insurance policy in the Business 
1len's Assurance Company, in the sum of 
$1,000.00 with double indemnity, payable to 
my estate. 
"Savings accounts with vValker Bank & 
Trust Company, First Security Bank & Trust 
Company and Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Company. 
''l\Iy hon1e situated at 1346 Thornton 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"Certain Inining stock in a ,.~ anadiun1 
Company. 
''Household furniture in Iny ho1ne at 
1346 Thornton Avenue and also at 141 First 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"'Certain personal belongings.'~ 
In paragraph III of her said "~in, ~Iaude Karren 
Richards provided for the pay1nent of funeral and burial 
14 
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expenses, etc., and in paragraph IV she bequeathed to 
certain named relatives the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00). 
Paragraph VI then provided a~ follo\vs: 
"'I hereby give, devise and bequeath all the 
rest, residue and remainder of any and all my 
estate both real and personal property whi~ch I 
rnay own at the time of 'my death to Ben S. 
Brewster of Salt Lake City, ·utah, if he survive 
me and if the said Ben S. Brewster does not 
survive me and 1ny brother l\1erton l{arren does 
survive n1e, then I hereby give, devise and be-
queath to my brother, Merton Karren, an a1nount 
equal to one-sixth (1/6) part of nty estate ex-
clusive of the amount my estate \vill be enhanced 
in value by the distribution of the estate of Ben 
S. Brewster. All the rest, ~residue and remainder 
of my estate, both real and personal, in the event 
Ben S. Brewster does not sttrvive 1ne, I hereby 
give, devise and bequeath to the chi1ldre11 of the 
said Ben S. Brewster in equal part, share and 
share alike, and if any of the said children of 
Ben S. Brewster have died leaving issue, then 
to their children by right of representation. In 
the event that neither 1ny brother J.l1 erton J( arren 
~nor Ben S. Brewster sttrvive me, then I hereby 
devi'Se and bequeath the whole of my estate to the 
children of the said Ben S. Brewster, as afore-
Jnentioned." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Court, in ease No. 8825 (Civil No. 107,499 helo\\') 
entered judgment as follo\vs: (R. 89-90) 
"\VHEREF,ORE, 11, IS 1-IEREBY ORDER-
ED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
'"1. That the Motion for Sununary Judg1nent 
of the defendant \Villia1n J\1: uir Barlo\v be and 
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the same is hereby denied. 
''2. That the ~Iotion for Summary Judgment 
of the plaintiffs be and the same is hereby 
granted. 
''3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to spe-
cific performance of the reciprocal will of ~laude 
ICarren Richards and the agreement between 
l\1aude Karren Richards and Ben S. Brewster, 
being pre-trial exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 insofar as 
the same apply to any and all properties de-
scribed in said exhibits or any and all assets of 
the estate of l\Iaude Karren Richards. 
~'-±. That the plaintiffs be and they are here-
by a'varded all of the estate of l\faude Karren 
Richards, deceased, provided, ho,vever, that they 
shall hold in trust such part thereof as may be 
necessary to pay the creditors of ~faude Karren 
Richards and the expenses of her last illness and 
burial, as 1nay be determined by the Court in 
Probate case No. 38411 (In the Matter of the 
Estate of ~laude K. Barlo,v, also kno"\\TJl as 
lVIaude Karren Richards, also lrno,,rn as ~laude 
1{. Richards, Deceased), and to further hold in 
trust one-sixth ( 1j6th) of the re1nainder of the 
said estate for l\Ierton I~arren, if he ,,~ere living 
at the date of the death of the said ~laude Karren 
Richards. 
'"5. IT IS SPEC1IFIC.A.I~Y ORDERED .A.ND 
DECREED: 
(a) That the defendant ,,~illia1n Barlov{ 
deliver to the plaintiffs all of the proceeds he 
1nay have reeeived fron1 the insurance policies 
on the life of l\Iaude Karren Richards issued by 
the vVest Co:u~t Life Insuranee Con1pany and the 
Busi nessn1en \~ Assurance C on1pany, or fron1 
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policies of insurance issued by the l{eserve Life 
Insurance ·Company paying benefits for hospital 
and n1edical expenses incurred by Maude Karren 
Richards. 
(b) That the defendant \Villian1 Barlow 
deliver to the plaintiffs all moneys in any bank 
account, "\Vhether held solely or jointly, in the 
nan1e of l\1aude Karren Richards and specifically 
any and all 1noneys withdra\vn by hiut fro1n any 
such accounts since the death of l\1aude Karren 
Richards, except as to any money contributed by 
\Villiam Barlow. 
(c) That the defendant \Villiant Barlo\v 
deliver to the plaintiffs all properties of any kind 
and nature located at the premises at 221 East 
Fourth South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, at 
the tirne of the death of the said l\iaude Karren 
Richards, and any and all other personal or real 
property of any kind or nature whatsoever and 
wheresoever located that are a part of the estate 
of Maude Karren Richards. 
(d) That the proceeds of the following 
described insurance policies be paid to the Clerk 
of this Court for the use and benefit of the plain-
tiffs: 
( 1) Policy No. 320549 and supple-
n1ental contract No. 1982, said policy being 
issued by the West Coast Life Insurance Co. 
upon the life of l\iaude Karren Richards and 
dated October 10, 1931. 
(2) Policy No. L-166920 issued by the 
Business1nen's Assurance C o m p any of 
America upon the life of Maude 1{. Richards. 
~'Dated this lOth day of Deee1nber, 1957. 
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· "B~ ·Y·' TH.-E' r 1 or~R· T ··-.:::·l·· .... '·. ·' . '\_I u . .,._ .... _, __ 
~ .... _.··>; ·. ·~·-~~ ··. 1 ·.1L~~~~-~~:.:;J,·; 
/s/ A. H. E~;L~T_T 
. . - . (~:_.. 
District Judge~'. 
Contrary to the contention of ·counsel (Barl~w-bfief~ 
p. 30), it is apparent that the reciprocal wiil·oi:·Maride 
ltarr~n Richards does contain a general clause··:corl~eYi~g 
''all the rest, residue and remainder," of her' estat'e<~ to 
Ben S. B~e,vster and certain contingent be~eficia;ie~. 
Barlow is only required in paragraph 5· (~) o~ _the 
judgrrient, to deliver such proceeds from· the na~ed 
insurance _policies as "he may have received.'' Counsel 
for Barlow has again misconstrued the judgwent=(Bar-
low . hrie~, p. 28-29). If he received no such_ proceeds 
then. he needn't worry. If he did, he shou14 __ forth'1th 
deliver the same to Hoyt vV. Bre,vster et al:.-
·;.· ·r· --~ 
:._:. ,_:_.;i!- .. -
Paragraphs 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the judg1rtent only 
., "';" 
award to plaintiffs such 1noney and property as·b~longed 
to Maude l{arren Richards. Barlow will never have to 
give up any of his "hard earned dollars" and th¢ sug.:. 
. - -- . •' 
gestion that future litigation n1ight be necessary·to ·ae~ 
termine which propertY: belonged to nlaude Karren Rich-
ards and which property belonged to Barlow only antici-
·pates Barlow's unwillingness to cooperate and surrender 
that which the trial court has said he, in ·justice and 
equity should. 
If it beco1nes necessary to in1plen1ent th-e judg1nent 
of the trial court by appropriate suppleinental·remedies 
such as appropriate Orders To ~ho\\~ Cause, etc.~ that 
is of no concern at this thne to this Court. 
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The .judgment as entered does nothing more than 
specifically enforce the agreement entered into by ~en 
S. Brewster and Maude Karren Richards on February 
7, 1939, evidenced by the written agreement between the 
parties and their reciprocal wills (Exs. 1, 2). It is just 
and equitable in every respect. Barlow is not forced to 
give up any money or property \vhich belongs to hiin 
separately. While he \Vould like to obtain a windfall, it 
is only just and equitable that the decree stand as entered 
inasmuch as Maude Karren Richards has already re-
ceived her p:ortion of the Ben S. Brewster estate as 
provided in his will. 
We will never know how much of her estate, en-
hanced by her share of the Ben S. Bre\vster Estate, 
Inight have been dissipated while she was married to 
Barlow. He seems to have been quite concerned about 
her estate for it \vill be noted that Barlow and Maude 
Karren Richards were 1narried August 25, 1952, (Ex. 
D-2) and we find ~laude Karren Richards executing an 
olographic will in his favor only 26 days later, on the 
20th day of September, 1952. (8682, R. 1) 
SUMMARY 
It is the contention of Hoyt W. Brewster, et al., 
that the Agreement of Maude Karren Richards entered 
into on February 7, 1939, with Ben S. Brewster, said 
agreement being represented by an actual written docu-
ment and a reciprocal will executed pursuant thereto 
(Exhibits 1 and 2), should be specifically enforced, and 
that the judgment of the trial court in the civil action 
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below· (8825,. R .. 88-90): should he ;:affiritr~d~: .It- i~/ not 
material that· Ben ·s. Brewster: ·m ·ms· reciprocal will:, m: 
providing for Maude Karren Richards, made no· menti.orr 
of any contemplation of marriage.· · 
.- . . . - ·. ~ . 
Section 74-1-26 U.C.A., 1953, does ·not require tha~ 
a· bequest to a woman who later . becomes the ·wife· ·of 
a testator appear on its face to be in contenip~~tio~ ~of 
marriage to prevent a revocation of the will. However~ 
should the Court hold to the contrary, then ·the said 
agreement of Maude Karren Richards should still· be 
specifically enforced, for William Muir Barlow. is not. a 
proper person to question the validity of the Brewstet 
will and probate thereof; (see initial brief, page :22) a!ld, 
further, he is barred by the provisions of Section 75~3:.12 
. . . 
U.C.A., 1953, from contesting the will of Ben S~ Brewste1~ 
or. the -probate of said will (see initial brief~. pag~ ~2-r 
All persons claiming under Maude Karren Richards are 
estopped to deny the validity of the ''i.II .()£ · Ben ... S. 
Brewster (see initial brief, page 24). 
The agreement entered into by ~laude Karren Rich.:. 
ards and Ben S. Brewster is evidenced by a written docu-
ment, and the reciprocal :wills. executed pursuant thereto 
state that they are made pursuant to the written agree-
ment. The Statute of Frauds is therefore fully satisfied. 
There was adequate consideration for the reciprocal 
will of Maude Karren Richards. She received her distri-
butive share under the will of Ben S. Brewster. It is 
only equitable and in accord "\vith good conscience to 
enforce her end of the bargain. 
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__ W.ill~~ ~uir Barlow personally and in his capacity 
as t:he executor of the later revoking will is a party 
defendant in the civil action below. 'l"'here is no lnerif 
- -
to any claim that the civil action is prema tl.ire . 
. As for the probate matters (Cases Nos. 8682 and 
8683), it is the contention of Hoyt W. Brewster, et al., 
that the judgment of the lower court in admitting the 
later revoking will to probate should be reversed and 
that the earlier reciprocal will of Maude Karren Rich-
ards should have been admitted to probate as her irre-
vocable last will and testament. While there are authori-
ties holding that the later revoking will should he 
admitted as the last will and testament of the decendent 
and--that the agreement be enforced in equity, there is 
excellent authority to the contrary, and certainly under 
the circUmstances of this case it would be merely an 
empty formality to probate the later revoking 'vill under 
which none of the estate would pass. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
AND RICHARDS 
By 
Attorneys for 
Hoyt W. Brewster, et al. 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt ake City, Utah 
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